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The Constitution entrusts the United States Senate with special respon-
sibility. In addition to its normal legislative functions, the Senate plays dis-
tinctive roles in treaty formation1 and in confirming officers of the executive 
and judicial branches.2 And the Constitution gives the Senate “the sole power 
to try impeachments,” including in those rare and historic occasions when 
the House of Representatives impeaches a President of the United States.3
Not only does the Senate conduct the trial without participation of the House 
of Representatives, its work is also not subject to review by the federal judi-
ciary.4 The roles assigned to the Senate, especially the last, reflect the high 
confidence the Constitution reposes in Congress’s upper chamber. The 
Framers recognized the risk that members of a political body would allow 
partisan loyalties to interfere with the impartial judgment that was required 
for the impeachment remedy to have meaning. Yet they thought the structure 
and composition of the Senate and the character of its members would miti-
gate against such misbehavior. 
The Constitution’s aspirations for the Senate were frustrated during the 
impeachment trial of President Donald J. Trump. The conduct of many mem-
bers of the Senate majority gave little indication that constitutional duty, ra-
ther than partisan considerations, motivated their behavior. Some members 
 Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law Emeritus, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Pro-
fessors Mark D. Rosen, Christopher Schmidt, and Carolyn Shapiro for the invitation to participate in this 
Symposium. Having learned from their work over the years, it was a privilege to be part of this important 
volume. Thanks, too, to Kathleen Casey and Matthew Tuegel of the Vincent C. Immel Library at Saint 
Louis University School of Law for the wonderful assistance they characteristically provided. 
 1.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”).
 2.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme 
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided 
for, and which shall be established by Law . . . .”). 
 3.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeach-
ments . . . .”).
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failed to demonstrate the type of impartial official behavior on which the 
Constitution depends, especially in unusual moments like presidential im-
peachment trials. Although cynics might insist that partisans will be partisans 
and accordingly dismiss as unrealistic any aspirations that senators and oth-
ers would rise above party to act in a dispassionate and objective manner, the 
Constitution depends on and adopts a more optimistic assessment of official 
and citizen behavior. That constitutional expectation is not an impossible 
dream. On the contrary, the assumption and possibility of such objective con-
duct can be found in two constitutional processes that bear important resem-
blances to presidential impeachment. 
The standard of public behavior was articulated repeatedly by former 
Attorney General Herbert Brownell more than one-half century ago when 
Congress considered a vexing problem somewhat like impeachment and re-
moval, namely how to devise procedures to allow decision-makers other than 
the President to separate a disabled President from the powers and duties of 
his office. Brownell provided the insight that in such crisis situations, the 
Constitution assumed and depended on what he called “constitutional mo-
rality” or “constitutional propriety,” the idea that in crisis situations public 
officials and citizens would elevate constitutional norms and national inter-
ests over partisan considerations.5 Although history has not yet presented 
episodes of constitutional morality in such presidential inability decision-
making, it has furnished a contemporary instance in a different context some-
what analogous to presidential impeachment trials, namely when the Senate 
must consider expelling a member. The behavior of Senator Thomas F. Ea-
gleton (D. Mo.) and Senator Bill Bradley (D. N.J.) in the 1982 Senate expul-
sion proceeding against Senator Harrison Williams (D. N.J.) illustrates the 
possibility of such constitutional morality, and their conduct presented a 
model of public service the current Senate majority would have been well 
advised to study and follow. 
This short essay begins by outlining the Constitution’s aspirations for 
the Senate in a presidential impeachment trial. It then develops the idea of 
constitutional morality as Brownell presented it in the analogous context of 
presidential inability. It will then describe the conduct of Eagleton and Brad-
ley as examples of constitutional morality before suggesting some conclu-
sions regarding the role of the Senate in the Trump impeachment trial. 
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I. THE SENATE AND PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT
The Constitution’s Framers regarded impeachment as an indispensable 
check on presidential behavior. They intended impeachment and removal to 
address not simply the rare instances where Presidents, Vice Presidents, or 
other civil officers engaged in treason and bribery, but also instances where 
they committed “other high crimes and misdemeanors.”6 The latter phrase 
was a catchall intended to encompass a broad range of constitutional of-
fenses. 
The final discussions in Philadelphia focused on presidential impeach-
ment since the Impeachment Clause was not broadened to include the Vice 
President and other civil officers7 until after the Convention debated and ap-
proved its basic terms as applicable to the President.8 The Framers resisted 
the proposal of the Committee of Eleven on September 4, 1787, which lim-
ited impeachable conduct to “treason or bribery.”9 George Mason objected 
to that narrow limitation since “[t]reason” would not “reach many great and 
dangerous offenses” such as the offenses Warren Hastings,10 the British 
Governor-General of India, had been impeached for in May of 1787, shortly 
before the Philadelphia Convention began.11 Mason initially proposed to add 
“maladministration,” but James Madison feared that formulation would au-
thorize the Senate to oust a President over policy disagreements.12 Mason 
then replaced “maladministration” with “other high crimes and misdemean-
ors against the state” and that version passed, eight states to three.13 The term 
adopted, Frank Bowman concludes, “was, by design, a flexible concept”14
which covered a wide range of official misconduct.15 Although the term did 
not make the President or other civil officers vulnerable to ouster due to pol-
icy differences,16 a consequence which would have resembled the parliamen-
tary arrangements the Constitution rejected, it clearly encompassed 
 6.  U.S. Const. art. II, §4. 
 7.  See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 552 (Max Farrand ed. 1911). 
The placement of the Clause in Article II is also suggestive. 
 8.  Id. at 550–52. 
 9.  Id. at 499, 550. 
 10.  Id. at 550. 
 11.  FRANK O. BOWMAN, III, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: A HISTORY OF IMPEACHMENT 
FOR THE AGE OF TRUMP 40 (2019). 
 12.  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 7, at 550. 
 13.  Id. at 550. The word “State” was replaced by “United States” by unanimous vote the same day. 
Id. at 551. 
 14.  BOWMAN, supra note 11, at 103. 
 15.  Id. at 103–11. 
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constitutional offenses which abused a public trust17 whether the conduct 
constituted an indictable crime or not. The impeachment proceeding would 
provide Congress “an essential check in the hands of that body upon the en-
croachments of the executive,”18 language which makes clear that “other 
high crimes and misdemeanors” included constitutional trespasses and 
which rebuts the argument that a crime or criminal-like offense was required. 
The overwhelming consensus among constitutional law scholars who have 
studied the subject finds that impeachable offenses are not limited to indict-
able crimes and include abuse of power.19
To attack the use of impeachment as upsetting the results of a presiden-
tial election, of course, wholly mischaracterizes the constitutional structure. 
The Framers included the remedy in the Constitution as a necessary check 
against constitutional offenses. If prior election immunized a President or 
Vice President from impeachment, the Constitution would not specifically 
subject those officials to the remedy’s reach. Nor does the Constitution ex-
clude impeachments from use during presidential election years. On the con-
trary, presidential impeachment is appropriate whenever the House of 
Representatives determines that a President has committed “treason, bribery 
or other high crimes and misdemeanors.”20
Trying impeachment imposed a responsibility with a “judicial charac-
ter”21 and the framers recognized the difficulty of finding an appropriate 
“court” to conduct the trial.22 Justice Joseph Story summarized the chal-
lenges facing an impeachment tribunal, writing: 
 17.  THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The sub-
jects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other 
words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar 
propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society 
itself.”); Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution § 746, at 520 (2nd ed. 1851) (“The jurisdiction 
is to be exercised over offences, which are committed by public men in violation of their public trust and 
duties.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 56–63, 121–24 (2017) (associating 
“high crimes and misdemeanors” with abuses of public trust whether criminal or not). 
 18.  THE FEDERALIST No. 66, supra note 17, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 19.  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 105 (3rd ed. 2019) (stating that major controversy relates to the range of 
nonindictable crimes subject to impeachment); BLACK, supra note 16, at 33, 39 (rejecting the idea that 
“other high crimes and misdemeanors” is limited to criminal behavior); SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 56–
63 (concluding that phrase applies to offenses against public even if not indictable crimes); Richard M. 
Pious, Impeaching the President: The Intersection of Constitutional and Popular Law, 43 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 859, 862, 866–76 (1999) (explaining that “high crimes and misdemeanors” includes “abuse of power” 
and is not limited to indictable crimes); Michael J. Gerhardt, Putting the Law of Impeachment in Perspec-
tive, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 905, 906, 913–18 (1999) (summarizing evidence and consensus that phrase is 
not limited to indictable crimes). 
 20.  U.S. Const., art. II, §4. 
 21.  THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 17, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 22.  Id. (“A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired 
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The great objects, to be attained in the selection of a tribunal for the trial 
of impeachments, are, impartiality, integrity, intelligence, and independ-
ence. If either of these is wanting, the trial must be radically imperfect. To 
ensure impartiality, the body must be in some degree removed from pop-
ular power and passions, from the influence of sectional prejudice, and 
from the more dangerous influence of mere party spirit. To secure integ-
rity, there must be a lofty sense of duty, and a deep responsibility to future 
times, as well as to God.23
Earlier drafts at the Constitutional Convention had empowered the Su-
preme Court, not the Senate, to conduct impeachment trials, an arrangement 
that underscored the impartial, not politically biased, nature of the undertak-
ing.24 Yet the Framers concluded that the Supreme Court was inadequate for 
the assignment. It would lack sufficient credibility to reconcile the public to 
a decision contrary to the charge imposed by the House of Representatives.25
Its small size also counseled against its use; such a controversial responsibil-
ity should be spread.26 Roger Sherman thought justices appointed by a Pres-
ident might feel beholden to him and accordingly not act impartially.27
Moreover, the accused might be subject to criminal prosecution in the federal 
judiciary. The Supreme Court’s impartiality in the criminal proceeding 
would be impaired if it had conducted the impeachment trial.28
The topic engendered debate in Philadelphia, and some, like Madison 
and Charles Pinckney, worried that making the President subject to an im-
peachment trial by the Senate would make him too dependent on the legisla-
ture.29 But the Convention defeated Madison’s motion to remove the Senate 
as trier of impeachments, nine states to two,30 and the Clause, with other 
amendments, was approved, ten states to one.31
Impeachment would address misconduct of public officials,32 and the 
prosecution of such political offenses would inevitably arouse community 
“passions” and divide the public, often consistent with “pre-existing fac-
tions.”33 This anticipated tendency presented the “greatest danger” that the 
 23.  Story, supra note 17, § 745, at 520. 
 24. BLACK, supra note 16, at 10. 
 25.  THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 17, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 26.  Id.; see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 7, at 551 
(remarks of Governeur Morris). 
 27.  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 7, at 551. 
 28.  THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 17, at 398–99 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 29.  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 7, at 551. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 552. 
 32.  THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 17, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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outcome would turn on party strength rather than on “the real demonstrations 
of innocence or guilt,”34 which Alexander Hamilton clearly thought were the 
appropriate criteria. Elected officials might mirror partisan sentiments and 
might have their requisite neutrality compromised because of their reflection 
of, or association with, the “most numerous faction.”35
Conducting an impeachment trial was a difficult job but someone had 
to do it, and the Framers thought the Senate was the best someone.36 Since 
an impeachment trial was a national inquisition into the conduct of public 
officials, the people’s representatives should be the inquisitors.37 The House 
of Representatives would determine whether to impeach a public official, 
leaving the Senate as the final arbiter.38
But the Senate did not draw the assignment simply by default. The 
Framers thought its qualities best suited it for the difficult trust involved. 
“Where else than in the Senate could have been found a tribunal sufficiently 
dignified, or sufficiently independent?”39 wrote Hamilton. The Senate’s stat-
ure and the senators’ lengthy elected terms would hopefully allow its mem-
bers to set aside partisan inclinations to discharge their responsibility with 
“the necessary impartiality.”40
Moreover, the nature of impeachable offenses made the Senate better 
suited than a court as the adjudicator. As Justice Joseph Story later explained, 
since impeachable offenses addressed a broad range of “political offenses,” 
they must be addressed by principles, standards, and customs known to 
statesmen, not jurists. Their political preparation would make senators more 
competent than judges to assess such behavior.41
 34.  Id. at 396–97. 
 35.  Id. at 397. 
 36.  GERHARDT, supra note 19, at 7 (stating that the Philadelphia convention found that the Senate 
presented the fewest problems). 
 37.  THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 17, at 397 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 38.  Id.
 39.  Id. at 398; see also Story, supra note 17 §775 at 540 (arguing that the Senate is the appropriate 
body to try impeachments due to its  independence, impartiality and public confidence). 
 40.  See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 17, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (“What other body 
would be likely to feel confidence enough in its own situation to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the 
necessary impartiality between an individual accused, and the representatives of the people, his accus-
ers?”). 
 41.  Story, supra note 17, §764, at 532–33 (“These are so various in their character, and so indefin-
able in their actual involutions, that it is almost impossible to provide systematically for them by positive 
law. They must be examined upon very broad and comprehensive principles of public policy and duty. 
They must be judged of by the habits, and rules, and principles of diplomacy, of departmental operations 
and arrangements, of parliamentary practice, of executive customs and negotiations, of foreign, as well 
as of domestic political movements; and in short, by a great variety of circumstances, as well those, which 
aggravate, as those, which extenuate, or justify the offensive acts, which do not properly belong to the 
judicial character in the ordinary administration of justice, and are far removed from the reach of munic-
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The Supreme Court’s subsequent determination42 that most issues re-
lating to the impeachment trial are political questions committed to the Sen-
ate for final resolution was perhaps predictable, but it raised the stakes. The 
Court’s conclusion meant that such issues could not be resolved in judicial 
proceedings. That determination generally removed any judicial check from 
the process and effectively gave the Senate the last word, subject only to its 
members’ political accountability. Accordingly, since they had to police 
their own behavior, senators had a greater duty to ensure they acted impar-
tially.43
Yet, as Hamilton pointed out, partisan attachments introduced an intrin-
sic problem into a proceeding premised on the impartiality of the surrogate 
judges and jurors. Many congressmen might find themselves “either defi-
nitely friendly or definitely inimical to the president.”44 Disqualification or 
recusal was not a viable option since many members might be affected. 
The Constitution structured the impeachment remedy to protect the 
President against an unfair proceeding. The division of powers between the 
House and Senate reduced the likelihood that the President would be perse-
cuted by “a factious spirit” in one of the branches.45 The requirement of a 
two-thirds vote in the Senate for conviction afforded the President further 
security.46 The high bar of the super-majority requirement encouraged care-
ful deliberation47 and reduced the likelihood of conviction and removal. That 
formidable obstacle would also deter the House of Representatives from im-
peaching except in egregious cases. The Vice President, who the framers 
anticipated would spend most of his time presiding over the Senate,48 was 
specifically banned from that role during a presidential impeachment trial.49
The rationale was not hard to imagine. As the successor, the Vice President 
would have a conflict of interest, so he was excluded to avoid the appearance 
judges. A tribunal, composed of the former, would therefore be far more competent, in point of intelli-
gence and ability, than the latter, for the discharge of the functions, all other circumstances being equal. 
And surely, in such grave affairs, the competency of the tribunal to discharge the duties in the best manner 
is an indispensable qualification.”). 
 42.  Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993). 
 43.  BLACK, supra note 16, at 23–24. 
 44.  Id. at 11. 
 45.  THE FEDERALIST No. 66, supra note 17, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  GERHARDT, supra note 19, at 10. 
 48.  See Joel K. Goldstein, Constitutional Change, Originalism, and the Vice Presidency, 16 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 369, 383, 386, 389–93 (2013). 
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or reality of unfairness.50 The senators were required to take an oath, in ad-
dition to the one they took upon entering their positions, which further sol-
emnized an impeachment trial. The presence of the Chief Justice as the 
Senate’s presiding officer in a presidential impeachment trial underscored 
the magnitude of the event, justifying a rare breach of the general constitu-
tional aversion to officers of one branch functioning in another. 
Although constitutional features like the division of power between the 
House and the Senate and the two-thirds requirement for conviction gave the 
President substantial protection from a politically-motivated removal, the 
Constitution was less successful in devising structural provisions to induce 
public men and women to disregard partisan pressure to support a President 
of their party who had committed a serious abuse of public trust. The Con-
stitution relied on more symbolic features to provide incentives to encourage 
the President’s co-partisans to acknowledge an overwhelming case to con-
vict. The oath and presence of the Chief Justice signaled that an impeach-
ment trial did not constitute business as usual. They added solemnity to the 
moment and served as reminders that the Senate was entrusted with a judi-
cial, not political/legislative, function.51 Senators must act with “total impar-
tiality, at least resembling that of a faithful judge or juror.”52
Nonetheless, those formalities constituted rather soft admonitions since 
they were unaccompanied by any structural enforcement. The Framers ex-
pected the Senate to consist of the nation’s most eminent men.53 John Jay 
thought the Constitution had “taken the utmost care” that senators would be 
“men of talents, and integrity.”54 The Framers of the Constitution envisioned 
the Senate as consisting of educated and virtuous public citizens who could 
“make sound judgments with the nation’s best interests in mind.”55 Senators 
should act as constitutional fiduciaries, not partisans. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY
The idea that public officials could and would overcome partisanship to 
rise to special constitutional occasions was implicit in the discussions of 
Hamilton and Justice Story and did not disappear with the passing of the 
 50.  Story, supra note 17, § 777, at 542 (“It was to preclude the vice president, who might be sup-
posed to have a natural desire to succeed to the office, from being instrumental in procuring the conviction 
of the chief magistrate.”). 
 51.  BLACK, supra note 16, at 11. 
 52.  Id.
 53.  THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 17, at 395 (John Jay) (describing the Senate as populated 
“by men the most able and the most willing to promote the interests of their constituents.”). 
 54. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 17, at 396 (John Jay). 
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early generations or the change in the manner of electing senators which oc-
curred when the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment56 in 1913 im-
posed direct election of senators instead of entrusting that task to state 
legislatures.57 In a different, but related, context, Herbert Brownell, President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s first Attorney General, addressed the general but 
vexing question of motivating public officials to discharge a constitutional 
responsibility that cut against their apparent partisan interests. Brownell’s 
insights came in a discussion of the problem of how to transfer power from 
a disabled President who is unable or unwilling to recognize his own inca-
pacity. Prior to ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Constitution 
contained no procedures for transferring power from a disabled President to 
the Vice President, and some doubt existed whether such a transfer would 
oust the President from office permanently rather than simply divesting him 
of presidential powers and duties while disabled. The Cold War and advent 
of the nuclear age made finding a solution important, and Eisenhower’s three 
presidential disabilities drew attention to the problem in the mid-1950s be-
fore Congress finally addressed it following the assassination of John F. Ken-
nedy on November 22, 1963.58
The Eisenhower Administration’s proposed constitutional amendment, 
which Brownell supported, called for the Vice President with the concur-
rence of a majority of the President’s Cabinet to determine the President’s 
inability and transfer presidential powers and duties (though not the presi-
dency) to the Vice President.59 Some were skeptical that those appointed by, 
and loyal to, the President would act to declare him disabled; others were 
fearful that a President might be improperly declared disabled. During his 
1957 testimony before the House of Representatives, Brownell replied: 
More important than any of the written safeguards are those provided by 
our political processes, for ultimately the operation of any constitutional 
arrangement, depends on public opinion, and upon the public’s processing 
a certain sense of constitutional morality. 
In the absence of this sense of constitutional morality on the part of the 
citizenry, there can be, of course, no guaranty against the usurpation of 
power or any coup d’etat. In other words, no mechanical or procedural 
solution will provide a complete answer, if one assumes hypothetical cases 
 56.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 57.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 58.  Joel K. Goldstein, Taking From the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring Presidential 
Continuity, 79 FORD. L. REV. 959, 964-65 (2010). 
 59.  Joel K. Goldstein, The Bipartisan Bayh Amendment: Republican Contributions to the Twenty-





      11/23/2020   10:40:39
42699-ckt_95-2 Sheet No. 20 Side B      11/23/2020   10:40:39
GOLDSTEIN MACRO FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/18/2020 3:25 PM 
484 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 95:2 
in which most of the parties are rogues and in which no sense of constitu-
tional propriety exists.60
Brownell shared essentially the same insight the following year in a law 
review article61 and repeated the idea several times in the 1960s when he 
testified before both houses of Congress62 as it moved to propose what be-
came the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. His observation was included without 
attribution in the committee reports in the Senate63 and House of Represent-
atives64 related to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
Brownell’s comment suggested three fundamental insights regarding 
how a constitutional democracy can encourage decision-makers to act as pa-
triots, not as partisans, when facing difficult questions about who should ex-
ercise presidential power. First, constitutional provisions are not self-
executing but depend upon human agency. The concept that the United 
States is “a government of laws, not people,” is not entirely accurate to the 
extent it suggests that laws can function appropriately independent of human 
behavior. On the contrary, public officials and citizens can frustrate the en-
forcement of, and can undermine, law by indifference or malevolence. The 
rule of law depends on the faithful and conscientious conduct of human be-
ings. Second, constitutional provisions depend on decision-makers being re-
sponsible officials, not rogues or opportunists who would subordinate duty 
to partisan advantage. And finally, public opinion, based on a citizenry com-
mitted to “constitutional morality,” provides the ultimate check in a democ-
racy. If officials misbehave or if they put personal or partisan advantage over 
constitutional principle, a democracy empowers—and indeed depends 
upon—the people to throw the rascals out. 
Presidential disability decision-making, the context in which Brownell 
offered his insight, bears some resemblance to presidential impeachment. 
The two represent the only constitutional remedies for separating a President 
from the powers and duties of his office before his term ends.65 In the case 
of impeachment, the President is divested of his office and perhaps precluded 
60.  Presidential Inability: Hearings before the Special Subcomm. On Study of Presidential Inabil-
ity of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 31 (1957) (statement of Herbert Brownell, Jr.). 
 61.  Herbert Brownell Jr., Presidential Disability: The Need for a Constitutional Amendment, 68
YALE L.J. 189, 200 (1958). 
 62.  Presidential Inability: Hearings before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 242 (1965) 
(statement of Herbert Brownell, Jr.); Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of the Vice Pres-
ident: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 88th Cong. 136 (1964) (statement of Herbert Brownell, Jr.). 
 63.  S. REP. NO. 89–66, at 13 (1965); S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 11 (1964). 
 64.  H.R. REP. NO. 89–203, at 13 (1965). 
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from holding any public office under the national government. In the case of 
presidential disability, the President retains office, but the powers and duties 
of the presidency are transferred to the Vice President for the period of the 
incapacity, which could be temporary, uncertain, or permanent.66 Impeach-
ment is initiated and tried in the respective houses of Congress, and the Vice 
President’s interest in the outcome is reason for disqualifying him as the pre-
siding officer over the trial. In presidential inability decision-making, the 
Vice President is a necessary participant.67
Brownell’s insight regarding presidential inability decision-making ap-
plies equally to the predicament of the President’s co-partisans during an 
impeachment trial. Both remedies empower presidential co-partisans to as-
sess in different ways the President’s fitness. And just as Brownell’s com-
ment assumed that decision-makers would place national well-being over 
partisan commitments in determining whether a President was unable to dis-
charge presidential powers and duties, so, too, impeachment presented a sim-
ilar imperative. The “integrity” or “conscience” of each senator was critical 
in ensuring the impartiality of senators who were hostile to or sympathetic 
to the President,68 but those traits were most important regarding the Presi-
dent’s supporters due to the absence of other external restraints on their be-
havior. 
III. THE EXPULSION PROCEEDINGS REGARDING SENATOR HARRISON 
WILLIAMS
Although our constitutional system presents no precise analogy to a 
presidential impeachment trial, the Senate’s decision whether to expel a fel-
low member bears some resemblance. Although members of Congress are 
not subject to impeachment and removal,69 they are subject to expulsion by 
their respective houses.70 Both constitutional proceedings involve determi-
nations on whether a public official’s conduct justifies removal, both deci-
sions are entrusted to the Senate, and both situations require some senators 
to assess the conduct of a co-partisan. A Senate expulsion proceeding may 
not have the visibility of a presidential impeachment trial, yet it is more likely 
to require senators to judge a colleague and perhaps a friend. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68. BLACK, supra note 16, at 11. 
 69.  GERHARDT, supra note 19, at 78–79 (explaining that senators and members of the House of 
Representatives are not subject to impeachment). 
 70.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish 
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The expulsion proceedings of Senator Harrison Williams (D. N.J.) in 
March of 1982 occasioned political leadership consistent with the constitu-
tional morality that Brownell described. In brief, Williams had been caught 
in a sting operation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in which he had 
agreed to provide political favors in exchange for loans from an agent posing 
as an Arab sheik to a titanium mining company in which he had a secret 
interest.71 Williams was convicted on nine felony counts in May 1981, after 
which the Senate Ethics Committee embarked on an investigation of Wil-
liams, found his behavior “ethically repugnant,” and recommended his re-
moval.72 Williams denied a criminal motive and claimed entrapment.73
Before the Senate, Williams was represented by the highly respected Senator 
Daniel Inouye (D. HI), who argued that senators had only been expelled for 
treason.74 Senate Minority Whip, Alan Cranston (D. CA), pressed for limit-
ing Williams’s sanction to a censure rather than expulsion.75 The Democrats 
had lost control of the Senate in 1980 in the Reagan landslide for the first 
time since 1955.76 Williams had been elected to the Senate four times.77 New 
Jersey’s Governor, Thomas Kean, was a Republican and could be expected 
to name a Republican to fill Williams’s seat should it become vacant,78
thereby swelling the Republicans 53-47 margin. 
The turning point in the expulsion proceedings came when Eagleton 
rose to respond to Inouye and Cranston. Eagleton described the expulsion 
proceeding as “the most distasteful aspect of service in the U.S. Senate.”79
Eagleton and Williams had been colleagues for thirteen years, during which 
time they had served together on the Committee on Labor and Human Re-
sources and had similar political philosophies.80 Eagleton described himself 
 71.  The Expulsion Case of Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (1982), U.S. SENATE, https://www.sen-
ate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/expulsion_cases/140HarrisonWilliams_expulsion.htm (last vis-
ited May 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/829Y-4VHQ]. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Party Division, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm
[https://perma.cc/W58G-QV7S] (showing Democrats achieved Senate majority in 1955 and held it until 
1981). 
 77.  Douglas Martin, Ex-Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., 81, Dies; Went to Prison Over Abscam 
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/20/nyregion/ex-senator-harri-
son-a-williams-jr-81-dies-went-to-prison-over-abscam-scandal.html [https://perma.cc/J2N8-QZYH]. 
 78.  Joel K. Goldstein, Placing principle over partisan advantage, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Nov. 
27, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/columnists/placing-principle-above-partisan-advantage/ar-
ticle_8095dbc9-f507-5733-8375-f795b20477d5.html [https://perma.cc/EWS9-TNST]. 
 79.  128 CONG. REC. 3645 (1982). 
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as the “showcase liberal on the Ethics Committee.”81 Eagleton saluted Wil-
liams’s accomplishments, stating that few senators in history could claim the 
legislative contributions of Williams or could match his record of having 
helped millions.82 Notwithstanding the “heavy hearts” in the Senate over the 
Williams situation, these factors made Eagleton’s “a shade heavier than 
some.”83
Yet Eagleton could not excuse Williams’s behavior or explain it more 
charitably. Williams had received outstanding legal representation at every 
stage of the proceeding.84 But the videotapes of his conduct provided the 
smoking gun, indeed a smoking machine gun, Eagleton said, of his “gross 
misconduct.”85
Eagleton rejected the argument that Williams’s misconduct could be 
excused. “If nontreasonous behavior be the sole benchmark of fitness to 
serve in this body, then one must ask how fit is this body in which we 
serve?”86 In response to the argument that Williams’s fate could befall any 
of the senators, Eagleton asked his colleagues to consider whether they 
would have “engaged in this tawdry, greedy enterprise” and, if they would 
have, he suggested they serve out their term “and passively fade into de-
served oblivion.”87 “Williams ha[s] not had the good grace and good judg-
ment” to resign from the Senate.88 “We should not perpetrate our own 
disgrace by asking him to stay.”89
Eagleton’s eloquent remarks affected his colleagues.90 Senator Alan 
Simpson (R. Wyo.) referred to “the powerful statement of Tom Eagleton—
whose remarks sucked all the air out of this Chamber the other evening. Pow-
erful stuff, indeed.”91 “I do not know when the Williams case began, but I 
do know when it ended. It ended with Tom Eagleton’s speech,” said Senator 
Ernest “Fritz” Hollings (D. S.C.).92
 81.  Id.
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 3646. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id.
 87.  Id.
 88.  Id.  
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See, e.g., id. at 3815 (remarks of Sen. Leahy) (citing Eagleton in rejecting censure as a remedy);
id. at 3974 (remarks of Sen. Wallop) (sharing Eagleton’s conclusion that it would be inappropriate to 
allow Williams to remain in Senate); id. at 3983 (remarks of Sen. Hatch) (associating himself with Ea-
gleton’s reasoning); id. at 4006 (remarks of Sen. Heflin) (referring to Eagleton’s “powerful and eloquent 
remarks”); id. at 3981 (remarks of Sen. Cranston) (referring to Eagleton’s comments). 
 91. 128 CONG. REC. 3978 (1982). 
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Eagleton was not the only senator who put patriotic duty over partisan 
and personal considerations. The day after Eagleton’s speech, New Jersey’s 
junior senator, Bill Bradley, risked alienating Williams’s New Jersey allies 
by speaking out in favor of his expulsion. Williams had helped Bradley ad-
just to the Senate,93 but Williams had accepted bribes and “[b]ribery inverts 
and mocks the democratic process, turning it upon itself,” Bradley said.94
The issue was not a “minor one” but went to the “core of democratic gov-
ernment—the faith people extend to political institutions.”95 Bradley would 
vote to expel his fellow New Jersey Democrat.96 Indeed, Bradley’s perfor-
mance was judged by Senator Howell Heflin (D. Ala.) to be “a remarkable 
profile in courage not seen in this Chamber in many years” especially since 
other senators had recently recused themselves when a senator from their 
state was accused of an ethical impropriety.97
Seeing the inevitable result after Eagleton’s remarks, Williams resigned 
on March 11, 1982.98 Senator Malcolm Wallop (R. Wyo.), the Ethics Com-
mittee chair, noted that the Senate had “passed through yet another of the 
innumerable gates of history . . . with compassion, courage, and a sense of 
honor.”99 The debate had demonstrated instances of senators’ “personal 
courage, putting our honor above friendship, our institution above poli-
tics.”100 The Senate “collectively ha[d] risen to the demand thrust upon it.”101
Heflin rejected the idea that the Senate would have been better had Williams 
resigned earlier. The debate had made the Senate and America stronger by 
forcing all to come to grips with the ethical questions raised.102 Wallop felt 
moved to add that there had been “no victors, no vanquished, but the Senate 
stands proud, and it should, in its own eyes and in the eyes of the public in 
dealing with the trust thrust upon it by the Constitution, a trust which could 
not and ought not to have been passed to any other entity.”103 Although none 
of its members had enjoyed the experience, “if there was a winner in all of 
this, a winner as an institution. . .the Senate measured up to what the Amer-
ican people ought to expect.”104
 93.  128 CONG. REC. 3816 (1982). 
 94.  Id. at 3817. 
 95.  Id.
 96.  Id.
 97.  Id. at 4004. 
 98.  Id. at 4003 (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at 4004 (letter of resignation of Sen. Williams).
 99.  Id. at 4004. 
 100.  Id.
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id.
 103.  Id. at 4005. 
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IV. THE TRUMP IMPEACHMENT TRIAL
The same could not be said regarding the performance of the Senate 
majority 38 years later in its conduct of the Trump impeachment trial. There 
was little to indicate that many members of the Senate majority displayed the 
“constitutional morality” that their role required during the Trump impeach-
ment trial. Unlike Eagleton and Bradley, who focused on constitutional and 
institutional concerns, rather than partisan loyalties, in favoring expulsion of 
their co-partisan Williams, few members of the Senate majority gave much 
appearance of impartial judgment. Only one, Senator Mitt Romney (R. 
Utah), voted to convict President Trump105 on one of the two counts106 not-
withstanding overwhelming evidence of an egregious abuse of official 
power. 
The facts regarding the Trump impeachment and trial are well-known 
to contemporary audiences such that no lengthy recitation is needed here, 
nor does space permit one. In essence, according to testimony from various 
witnesses, Trump orchestrated an effort, through his own activities and that 
of government and non-government officials, to persuade President Vo-
lodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine to announce an investigation into former Vice 
President Joe Biden and his son, Hunter, by withholding security assistance 
Congress had appropriated for Ukraine as well as other signs of American 
support. At the time, Biden was widely perceived as Trump’s strongest Dem-
ocratic rival in the 2020 election. Although Trump directed government of-
ficials not to comply with subpoenas to testify or to produce relevant 
documents, some government officials provided evidence of the conduct of 
Trump and others allegedly acting at his direction. Trump ultimately released 
the aid for Ukraine, but only after a whistleblower’s complaint became pub-
lic, thereby alerting Trump and his associates to the need to minimize the 
damage from the scheme. 
Senator Romney concluded that Trump’s interest in having Ukraine in-
vestigate the Bidens was a “political pursuit” and that his interest in having 
them investigated was dependent on their names being Biden. Trump’s be-
havior was “so extreme and so egregious that it rises to the level of a high 
crime and misdemeanor,”107 Romney concluded. He continued: 
The president asked a foreign government to investigate his political rival. 
The president withheld vital military funds from that government to press 
it to do so. The president delayed funds for an American ally at war with 
 105. 116 CONG. REC. S937 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2020). 
 106.  Id. at S938. 
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Russian invaders. The president’s purpose was personal and political. Ac-
cordingly, the president is guilty of an appalling abuse of public trust. 
What he did was not perfect. No, it was a flagrant assault on our electoral 
rights, our national security and our fundamental values. Corrupting an 
election to keep oneself in office is perhaps the most abusive and destruc-
tive violation of one’s oath of office that I can imagine.108
Some of Romney’s Republican colleagues also expressed serious mis-
givings about Trump’s conduct yet did not believe it constituted an impeach-
able offense. Senator Lisa Murkowski (R. Alaska) recognized that “[t]he 
President’s behavior was shameful and wrong. His personal interests do not 
take precedence over those of this great Nation.”109 Senator Todd Young (R. 
Ind.) voted for acquittal but went out of his way to “pointedly emphasize 
what I am not arguing, that a President can lawfully do ‘whatever he wants,’ 
that inviting foreign election interference is appropriate, that absolute im-
munity attaches to Executive Privilege, or that a statutory offense must be 
committed to impeach.”110 Senator Susan Collins (R. Me.) concluded that “it 
was clear” that Trump’s call for an investigation into the Bidens’ activities 
during the July 25 call “was improper and demonstrated very poor judg-
ment.”111 Collins said it was wrong for Trump to mention the Bidens and 
request an investigation of a political rival.112 Senator Rob Portman (R. 
Ohio) agreed that it was “inappropriate and wrong” for Trump to ask Zelen-
sky to investigate Vice President Biden during the July 25 call and that it was 
“inappropriate” for administration members and private individuals to act to 
delay assistance to Ukraine pending an investigation.113 Senator Lamar Al-
exander (R. Tenn.) also concluded that “it was inappropriate” for Trump “to 
ask a foreign leader to investigate his political opponent and to withhold U.S. 
aid to encourage this investigation.”114 Senator Charles Grassley (R. Iowa) 
emphasized that he did not believe Trump’s conduct was “above re-
proach.”115 Senator John Thune (R. S.D.) acknowledged that Trump’s “judg-
ment” regarding his Ukraine conduct could fairly be debated and recognized 
the possibility that “his actions were inappropriate” but did not believe they 
constituted high crimes and misdemeanors.116
 108.  Id. 
 109. 116 CONG. REC. S806 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2020) (statement of Sen. Lisa Murkowski). 
 110.  Id. at S807 (statement of Sen. Todd Young). 
 111.  See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S841 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2020) (statement of Sen. Susan Collins). 
 112.  Id. at S841–42. 
 113.  See, e.g., id. at S844 (statement of Sen. Robert Portman). 
 114.  116 CONG. REC. S878 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2020) (statement of Sen. Lamar Alexander). 
 115.  Id. at S911 (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley). 
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It is, of course, often difficult to ascribe motives to officials, and per-
haps many of the majority members acted based on their good faith assess-
ments in concluding that Trump’s behavior did not merit conviction and 
removal. Yet some aspects of the behavior of many in the Senate majority 
seemed troubling. The majority repeatedly rejected efforts to hear any evi-
dence, including from Trump’s former National Security Adviser, John Bol-
ton, who offered to testify and who, according to contemporary reports, had 
written in his then forthcoming memoir that Trump had told him in July of 
2019 that he wanted to continue withholding the aid from Ukraine until 
Ukrainian officials responded favorably regarding the Biden investiga-
tions.117 Such an assertion from a high-ranking presidential associate would 
seem to provide direct evidence to support the House managers’ assertion of 
a quid pro quo, and one might have expected an impartial judge to have won-
dered what context and additional evidence Bolton might provide. Yet on 
numerous occasions, the majority senators overwhelmingly rejected motions 
to call Bolton rather than hear evidence which would embarrass the Repub-
lican President. 
Having refused to hear Bolton’s evidence, some based their votes to 
acquit in part on the absence of direct evidence that Trump withheld military 
aid in exchange for an investigation of the Bidens,118 the precise evidence 
Bolton seemed prepared to provide. Although some Senate Republicans had 
defended Trump by denying the existence of any evidence that tied Trump 
to the arms-for-Bidens “favor,” Senator Lamar Alexander (R. Tenn.) dis-
missed Bolton’s testimony as simply corroborating what was already known. 
Senator Alexander said there was no need for more evidence that Trump had 
asked Zelensky to investigate the Bidens and had withheld military aid at 
least partly to “pressure” Ukraine to investigate the Bidens.119 More recently, 
the availability of Bolton’s memoir confirmed reports that it claimed that 
Trump had withheld $400 million security assistance from Ukraine until it 
provided information that would damage his rivals and help him politi-
cally.120
 117.  Maggie Haberman and Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Tied Ukraine Aid to Inquiries He Sought, 
Bolton Book Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/26/us/politics/trump-
bolton-book-ukraine.html [https://perma.cc/VKF4-ZAGL].
 118.  See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S799 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2020) (statement of Sen. James Inhofe) (de-
scribing House allegations as “secondhand” and complaining of lack of “direct” evidence). 
 119.  116 CONG. REC. S877 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2020) (statement of Sen. Lamar Alexander). 
 120.  See, e.g., Rosalind S. Helderman and Josh Dawsey,  In new book, Bolton belatedly says Trump 
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Other justifications also were troubling. Senator Collins claimed that 
the Framers “recognized” that if the Senate removed a sitting President, it 
would be acting against the voters who elected him or her,121 an assertion 
that was at best an inelegant statement since there is no reason to believe that 
voters who elected a President would wish him or her to retain office if guilty 
of offenses justifying conviction and removal. Presumably, the Framers 
thought that impeachment would allow the people’s representatives to vin-
dicate democratic, noncorrupt government by acting to expose and sanction 
offenses that occurred or were discovered after election. They would not 
have provided impeachment as a remedy against presidential and vice-pres-
idential misconduct unless they thought sometimes elected officials should 
be removed in that manner. Some majority senators argued that convicting 
President Trump would deprive the American people of the right to make 
their own decision in November122 and that the impeachment process re-
flected a distrust of the American people.123 Senator Mitt Romney pointed 
out correctly that the Constitution rejects that argument since it invests the 
power of trying impeachments in the Senate, not the voters.124 Moreover, 
removal and disqualification from holding further office are distinct punish-
ments, and whereas the former follows from a conviction the latter must be 
separately imposed.125 Accordingly, the Senate could have removed Trump 
from office yet not disqualified him from holding further office. That might 
not have been an appealing prospect for Republican officials who did not 
want to weaken their party’s standard-bearer, yet that consideration should 
not motivate an impartial decision-maker. Some suggested that Trump’s be-
havior was not an appropriate basis for impeachment because it related to 
foreign policy.126 Yet that logic cannot reflect the meaning of a Constitution 
that makes impeachment and removal appropriate for treason and which im-
poses the constraints of the Foreign Emoluments Clause.127 Others com-
plained that it was inappropriate for the Senate to act as a factfinder in an 
 121.  See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S841 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2020) (statement of Sen. Susan Collins). 
 122.  See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S806 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2020) (statement of Sen. Lisa Murkowski); 
116 CONG. REC. S814 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2020) (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell); id. at S816 (state-
ment of Sen. John Thune); id. at S817 (statement of Sen. Joni Ernst); id. at S818 (statement of Sen. Roger 
Wicker); id. at S826 (statement of Sen. Shelley Capito); id. at S835 (statement of Sen. Steven Daines); 
id. at S844–45 (remarks of Sen. Rob Portman; cf. 116 CONG. REC. at S796 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2020) (state-
ment of Sen. Marsha Blackburn) (complaining that Democrats were trying to prelitigate the 2020 elec-
tion). 
 123.  See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S817 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2020) (remarks of Sen. Joni Ernst). 
124. 116 CONG. REC. S897 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2020) (statement of Sen. Mitt Romney). 
 125.  GERHARDT, supra note 19, at 80–81. 
 126.  See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S817 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2020) (statement of Sen. Joni Ernst). 
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impeachment proceeding,128 an anomalous understanding of such a proceed-
ing. Senator Charles Grassley complained that the House’s case turned on 
Trump’s motive and suggested that such a subjective inquiry was inappro-
priate.129 Yet in law and politics, motive is often dispositive. Some senators 
protested that they lacked information about the anonymous whistleblower 
whose complaint effectively initiated the process130 without acknowledging 
that the whistleblower’s identity is irrelevant since his or her allegations had 
all been corroborated by witnesses with knowledge. Many senators seemed 
to be uttering talking points,131 and various speeches were laden with politi-
cal comments.132
The majority party’s support for Trump stands in marked contrast to the 
behavior of Senate Republicans nearly fifty years ago during the impeach-
ment proceedings directed against President Richard M. Nixon relating 
largely to his participation in covering up the involvement of persons asso-
ciated with his re-election campaign with the break-in at the Democratic 
headquarters at the Watergate. The Court-ordered release of some incrimi-
nating tapes made clear that Nixon participated in the Watergate cover-up 
beginning less than a week after the break-in. Nixon received reports from 
his staff133 and from Republican legislative leaders134 that the House would 
impeach him and the Senate would convict him with virtually all Republi-
cans abandoning him. Nixon elected to resign instead. 
I suspect that many, myself included, who agree with Senator Romney 
that Trump committed “high crimes and misdemeanors” for which he should 
have been convicted, view Trump’s misconduct as worse than Nixon’s. 
Whereas both Nixon and Trump acted to undermine the operation of the 
democratic process, Trump’s behavior was a particularly egregious abuse of 
constitutional principles because he subordinated America’s national secu-
rity and that of an ally to advance his electoral fortunes. I suspect that 
Trump’s supporters may have seen the issue quite differently if a recent 
 128.  See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S825 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2020) (statement of Sen. Deb Fischer); id. at 
S834 (statement of Sen. David Perdue) (stating that the Senate is charged with ruling based on the evi-
dence the House produces). 
 129.  116 CONG. REC. S791 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2020) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley). 
 130.  Id. at S796 (statement of Sen. Blackburn). 
 131.  116 CONG. REC. S813–14 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2020) (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell) (claim-
ing Democrats impeached Trump for defeating Hillary Clinton). 
 132.  Id. at S804 (statement of Sen. Kelly Loeffler). 
 133.  RICHARD M. NIXON, THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 1067 (1978). 
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Democratic President had behaved as Trump did. Why, then, did Trump’s 
Senate co-partisans support him whereas Nixon’s abandoned him?135
Nixon, of course, resigned to escape impeachment during his second 
term when the Twenty-Second Amendment136 barred him from seeking re-
election, whereas Trump was impeached in his first term as he prepared to 
seek re-election. Yet it is possible that co-partisans might be more eager to 
rid themselves of an unpopular first-term president rather than run and (pos-
sibly) serve with him again. More likely, Trump benefitted from the retained 
loyalty of his base, and his approval ratings, of about 40%, exceeded Nixon’s 
at the end.137 Moreover, most of Trump’s Senate support was from majority 
senators from small red states where Trump remained popular, whereas the 
less ideological parties in Nixon’s day produced Republican senators in 
some competitive states. Some 50 of the 52 senators who voted to acquit 
Trump came from states he won in 2016.138 Some 43 of his 52 votes came 
from 22 states where Republicans held both Senate seats.139 The loyalty of 
Trump’s base may have led some Republican senators to fear that bucking 
him would produce a primary challenge or alienate their partisan constitu-
ency. 
More than two decades ago, Richard Pious recognized the role of public 
opinion in shaping impeachment outcomes. He observed that “there is a com-
mon law of impeachment that derives from the common sense of the public, 
and will then likely be reflected back into the House and Senate.”140
In fact, democracy envisions a continuing dialogue between represent-
atives and those represented. Senators will be attuned to popular opinion in 
their states, especially that of the constituents to whom they look to sustain 
them in office, yet they also have a responsibility to shape that opinion by 
vindicating constitutional norms. Brownell’s concept of political morality 
assumed a virtuous public whose attentive opinion would provide incentive 
to decision makers to vindicate constitutional norms and the public interest 
 135.  Cf. 116 CONG. REC. S790 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2020) (statement of Sen. Martin Heinrich) (noting 
that Nixon’s co-partisans deserted him, whereas Trump’s had not). 
 136.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (“No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than 
twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years 
of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of President 
more than once . . . .”). 
 137.  Presidential Approval Ratings—Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/116677/presidential-approval-ratings-gallup-historical-statistics-
trends.aspx [https://perma.cc/8W28-K4QX]. 
 138.  How Senators Voted on Trump’s Impeachment, POLITICO (Feb. 5, 2020), 
https://www.politico.com/interactives/2019/trump-impeachment-vote-count-senate-results/ (showing 
senators who voted to acquit Trump and how their states voted in 2016) [https://perma.cc/ZJ7D-ZJNU]. 
139.  Id. (showing states of senators who voted to acquit Trump). 
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even when those values counseled rebuking a co-partisan. It also envisioned 
decision makers who would act with constitutional morality, as Eagleton and 
Bradley did, even when such behavior ran counter to their partisan interests. 
Ultimately, the perpetuation of constitutional norms will depend upon a pub-
lic committed to constitutional morality and public officials who are willing 
to act as Senator Romney did, notwithstanding the political consequences. 
The Founders hoped that the Senate would fulfill that expectation in 
conducting an impeachment trial. In 2020, the majority let them down. 
Copyright Joel K. Goldstein 2020 
